The pivot between containment, engagement, and restraint : President Obama’s conflicted grand strategy in Asia by Löfflmann, Georg
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Löfflmann, Georg. (2016) The pivot between containment, engagement, and restraint : 
President Obama’s conflicted grand strategy in Asia. Asian Security, 12 (2). pp. 92-110. 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/81823                
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for  profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
“This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Asian Security on 
30/06/2016 available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/14799855.2016.1190338  
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version.  Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
  
The Pivot between Containment, Engagement and Restraint – President Obama’s 
conflicted Grand Strategy in Asia. 
 
Abstract: This article examines the formulation and implementation of American 
grand strategy under the Obama administration, and how the ‘pivot to Asia’ functions 
within this strategic context. It argues that President Obama attempts to secure 
continued American hegemony through a combination of cooperative engagement 
and restraint. This exposes a fundamental dilemma at the heart of America’s 
rebalancing: Increased engagement with U.S. allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific is 
fueling political, economic and military competition with China. Sequestration and 
questions over American strategic coherence and consistency are simultaneously 
undermining the credibility of the pivot, both at home and abroad. The article 
concludes that this dilemma makes it unlikely for the pivot to succeed in its stated 
aims, unless the United States re-emphasizes cooperative engagement with China.  
 
The foreign and security policy of the Obama administration has provoked a continuous 
debate in policy circles, popular media and IR scholarship over the character of the ‘Obama 
Doctrine,’ and the course of American grand strategy.1 At the heart of this debate lies the 
question if President Obama continues to pursue an established strategic course of ‘deep 
  
 
  
2 
engagement’ and ‘liberal hegemony’ for the United States, of if he has initiated a profound 
shift in U.S. foreign and security policy towards a position of military restraint and 
geopolitical retrenchment.2 Predominantly, the rebalancing of the United States to the Asia-
Pacific, and in particular the military component of the ‘pivot’, have been viewed as 
confirmation for the former position, as geostrategic shift designed to reaffirm American 
primacy in the region against the challenge of a rising China.3 Contradictory voices have 
characterized the pivot as mere ‘rhetoric’ without a serious commitment to underwrite 
America’s leadership role in the Asia-Pacific, while others have framed it as 
counterproductive attempt to contain China.4  
 
Even observers that have conceded that Obama’s foreign and security policy carries elements 
of a realist ‘offshore balancing’ strategy however, tend to frame the pivot in contrast to his 
focus on restraint. Here, Obama is seen as pursuing a grand strategy of selective engagement, 
designed to ‘safeguard continued preponderance in the Asia-Pacific.’5 This article suggests 
that a critical analysis of the discursive construction and practical impact of American grand 
strategy under the Obama presidency reveals a more complex and contradictory picture of the 
Asian pivot that questions the coherence and consistency of the rebalancing in both ideational 
and practical terms. First, the article will demonstrate how the ‘Obama Doctrine’ attempts to 
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reconfigure America’s global leadership role through ‘burden sharing’ and greater military 
restraint. Here, President Obama has frequently invoked the rhetoric of American primacy 
while pursuing practical measures more in line with strategic options of cooperative 
engagement and realist offshore balancing.  
 
It will then examine in detail the diplomatic, economic and military measures undertaken 
since the announcement of the pivot and how these practical initiatives served the stated 
strategic objectives: maintaining security and stability in the region; strengthening existing 
alliances; developing new partnerships; and engaging China as a ‘responsible stakeholder.’ 
Here, the analysis suggests that increased cooperative engagement with U.S. allies and 
partners in the region has in turn fueled Chinese fears of American containment, resulting in 
geopolitical and geo-economic counter-measures aimed against U.S. hegemony in the region.  
 
Finally, the article will consider the issue of the credibility of the pivot, both in the United 
States and abroad. Here, the focus lies on the fiscal effects of budget sequestration on U.S. 
defense policy, the domestic impact of American politics on the rebalancing, and how 
America’s enduring global commitments affect its ability to concentrate strategically on the 
Asia-Pacific. The article concludes that the strategic dilemma at the heart of the rebalancing 
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results from the competing impulses of hegemony, engagement and restraint prevalent in 
U.S. foreign and security policy. While this basic tension is unlikely to be fully resolved, 
seeking greater cooperative engagement with China could address some of the imbalances 
that have accompanied the pivot since its inception.  
 
President Obama and American grand strategy: Sustaining American leadership 
through engagement and restraint  
 
A grand strategy is supposed to provide orientation about a country’s role in the world, and to 
dedicate the nation’s power and material resources toward achieving the goals the strategy 
sets out.6 American grand strategy should answer fundamental questions about ‘America’s 
core national interest’ and ‘the purpose of American power,’ according to the influential 
Center for a New American Security (CNAS) think tank. 7  The principle goals of U.S. 
national security policy are oriented at maintaining and promoting a liberal international 
order that was formed ‘under American stewardship’ following World War II.8 As the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) has stated in its 2014 Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR):  
 The United States exercises global leadership in support of our interests: U.S. security 
 and that of our allies and partners; a strong economy in an open economic system; 
 respect for universal values; and an international order that promotes peace, security, 
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 and opportunity through cooperation.9  
These goals are thus fairly consistent and stable over time, and neither of these strategic 
objectives is particularly novel, or controversial among the majority of the foreign policy 
establishment in the United States.10 Crucially, the ability to act as a ‘benevolent hegemon’ 
and provide global leadership is seen as depending on the military preeminence of the United 
States, and its ability for global power projection and command of the ‘global commons’ of 
sea, air, and outer space (and now cyber space).11 However, it is the way the United States 
envisions how to bring about this vision of Pax Americana that reveals the actual character of 
American grand strategy.  
 
Under President Obama, expansive liberal-internationalist goals are frequently paired up with 
limited means and realpolitik considerations, producing a strategic mismatch between stated 
geopolitical ambitions and the actual involvement of American engagement. This conflicted 
stance of U.S. foreign and security policy has been on display in the ‘leading from behind’ 
intervention in Libya, the caveated response against ISIS, allowing for air strikes but not 
‘boots on the ground,’ and the handling of the Ukraine crisis, where the United States took a 
diplomatic backseat behind Germany’s negotiations with Russia.12 
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The themes of engagement and restraint have been reiterated numerous times by the Obama 
administration: from the Pentagon’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and 2012 Defense 
Strategic Guidance (DSG); to the declaration of the ‘Obama Doctrine’ at West Point; or the 
President’s remark that U.S. policy should primarily avoid doing ‘stupid stuff.’ 13   The 
articulation of American grand strategy at the highest level has been concerned with both 
sharing and limiting the economic and military costs of America’s global leadership role.  
 
The 2010 QDR, for example, stated that: “(…) the United States will remain the most 
powerful actor but must increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain 
stability and peace.”14 The 2012 DSG linked continued efforts to work with U.S. allies and 
partners to a more cooperative vision of American hegemony: “Building partnership capacity 
elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of 
global leadership.” 15  American grand strategy under the Obama administration, and in 
particular the emphasis on cooperative engagement in sustaining a liberal international order, 
reflected a ‘post-American world’ scenario, in which the diffusion of power and the ‘rise of 
the rest’ were ending an era of unipolar American primacy, and where relative decline would 
mean that the United States was still the most influential, but no longer the sole dominant 
power in the international system.16 
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The White House and the Pentagon also responded to this development by recalibrating and 
downsizing America’s geostrategic level of ambition. While the 2012 Defense Strategic 
Guidance rebalanced the U.S. military to the Asia-Pacific, it also officially reformulated, for 
the first time since the end of the Cold War, the standard measure for the global power 
projection capability of the United States. This had been defined as the ability to fight two 
major regional conflicts (MRCs) simultaneously. Instead, the standard was reduced to the 
ability to fight one major war and act defensively against the aggressive aspirations of 
another actor in a second conflict. 17 In addition, U.S. forces would ‘no longer be sized to 
conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.’ 18  Under Obama, the United States 
pursued a grand strategy of ‘hegemony light.’ 
 
In his opening remarks to the Defense Strategic Guidance document, President Obama also 
referred to the Budget Control Act of 2011, and the need to reduce defense spending, in order 
to ‘renew our long-term economic strength.’19 The strategy review leading up to the DSG 
was initiated in April 2011, in order to identify $400 billion in additional savings in the 
defense budget as part of a broader effort to achieve $4 trillion in deficit reduction over 12 
years.20 With the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the onset of sequestration in 2013 the 
Pentagon would ultimately face a reduction in previously planned defense spending levels of 
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about $1 trillion over ten years, compared to original estimates. While the United States 
would maintain by far the largest single defense budget in the world, sequestration was 
another signifier that American primacy would be less pronounced than in the immediate 
post-Cold War and 9/11-era.  
 
As Obama explained in context with the new National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2015: 
“(…) the challenges we face require strategic patience and persistence.” 21  Beyond an 
assessment of threats and a calculation of resources however, an American grand strategy 
also functions as articulation of a national vision by the political leadership, which defines 
America’s role in the world. Here, the Obama administration has laid an emphasis on the 
limitations of American power, and the virtues of restraint, rather than on remaking the world 
in America’s image. The 2015 National Security Strategy again revealed this tension between 
contradictory impulses. While the document described America’s global leadership role as 
‘indispensable,’ it also stated that American resources and influence were ‘not infinite’ and 
that the United States should not ‘attempt to dictate the trajectory of all unfolding events 
around the world.’22 Although, according to the NSS, ‘American exceptionalism’ remained a 
reality, due to the country’s unique economic and military superiority, and liberal value 
system, the United States should lead first and foremost though its allies and partners, and 
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consider military power only one of many tools at its disposable, and not necessarily always 
the most effective one.23 As President Obama explained in May 2014, discussing the use of 
military power by the United States during a speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West 
Point: “Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.”24 
Under Obama, American grand strategy attempted to bridge contradictory impulses, seeking 
to maintain the country’s global leadership position and to pursue a commensurate national 
security agenda, while practicing limited engagement and hegemonic restraint. The ‘pivot to 
Asia’ has operated within these conflicted parameters of U.S. foreign and security policy the 
Obama administration has set. 
 
The Pivot between Engagement and Containment 
 
In September 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced ‘America’s Pacific 
Century’ with great enthusiasm in an article for Foreign Policy, declaring that: “(…) there 
should be no doubt that America has the capacity to secure and sustain our global leadership 
in this century as we did in the last.”25 The ‘pivot to Asia’ was framed as a geopolitical 
refocusing, - a substantially increased investment of the United States, diplomatically, 
militarily, and economically in the Asia-Pacific. As a grand strategy, it was designed to 
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secure America’s lasting engagement with the region as a ‘Pacific power,’ and reinvigorate 
the country’s global leadership position, which seemed in decline since the financial crisis of 
2008 and U.S. setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. During his speech to the Australian 
Parliament on 17 November 2011 President Obama clearly outlined the pivot as geopolitical 
transition of America’s strategic priorities from the post-9/11 environment towards a Pacific 
future: “As we end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our 
presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority.”26 In the more than four years since 
this geostrategic shift has been announced however, major U.S. think tanks, prominent media 
commentators, Congressional reports, and even senior military and civilian Pentagon officials 
have all questioned the credibility of the pivot, or wondered if it ever took place in the first 
place.27 This raises the question, if the pivot strategy has actually functioned as a coherent 
and consistent link between stated objectives, invested means, and the ways envisioned to 
produce desired outcomes.  
 
The key goals of the pivot, later renamed rebalancing to dispel fears about U.S. withdrawal 
from Europe and elsewhere, follow from the general aim of American grand strategy to 
sustain the leadership position of the United States within a liberal international order. 
According to then National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon, the overarching objective of 
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the United States in the Asia-Pacific region was ‘a stable security environment and a regional 
order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal 
rights and freedoms’.28 In order to achieve this outcome, the Obama administration aimed to 
implement a ‘a comprehensive, multidimensional strategy,’ focused on five key areas: the 
strengthening of existing alliances; deepening partnerships with emerging powers; 
development of a stable, constructive relationship with China; the empowering of regional 
institutions; and helping to build a regional economic architecture to sustain shared 
prosperity.29  
 
The diplomatic pivot 
Existing alliances that were strengthened since the announcement of the pivot include U.S. 
relations with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand.30 In August 2014, 
the United States and Australia concluded a 25-year agreement to station around 2.500 U.S. 
Marines in Darwin on a rotational basis. The United States and the Philippines executed an 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) allowing the U.S. to conduct operations 
and temporarily station troops on Philippine territory after a 25-year absence form the 
country. The United States also demonstrated its renewed focus on the region by further 
integrating itself in its institutional architecture, becoming a formal member of the East Asia 
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Summit in 2011, and elevating the relationship with ASEAN, appointing the first U.S. 
resident ambassador to the organization the same year. 31  This process continued with 
institutionalization of the annual U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Summits, and the conclusion of a 
‘strategic partnership’ agreement in November 2015.  
 
Passively hedging against the growing influence of China, while avoiding direct 
confrontation, was one of the prime motives for many South and East Asian nations to further 
develop cooperation with the U.S., both economically and militarily, in particular in light of 
growing Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Sea. For the United States, 
institutional involvement in the Asia-Pacific also meant the use of collective bodies to 
counter China more actively. This discrepancy was partially illustrated by the failure of the 
United States to include a specific mentioning of China in a joint statement on peace, security 
and stability in the region following the U.S.-ASEAN summit in February 2016 in California, 
the first ever to take place on U.S. soil.32   
 
A key focus of the pivot has been the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In July 2013, 
Japan became a fully-fledged participant in the TPP negotiations. The United States could 
also resolve a long-standing dispute with the Japanese government over the stationing of 
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American troops on Okinawa, although relocation of the Futenma Air Base continues to meet 
with resistance by the local government in Okinawa. On the Japanese side, Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe has undertaken a series of steps to raise Japan’s national security profile, and to 
cooperate more closely with the United States. 33  This has included establishment of a 
National Security Council (NSC) and the publication of the country’s first ever National 
Security Strategy (NSS) in December 2013, which made strengthening the U.S.-Japan 
alliance a key strategic priority. Improving jointness and interoperability with U.S. forces 
were also key components in the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which 
singled out the ‘rapid expansion and intensification of Chinese activities on the sea and in the 
air’ as major challenge Japan faced in the evolving security environment in the Asia-
Pacific.34   
 
Highly significantly in this context was also the Abe government’s reinterpretation of Article 
9 of the Japanese Constitution to allow for collective self-defense. This would provide the 
legal framework for the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) to act in direct defense and 
support of the U.S. as the country’s main ally.35 Japan’s strategic focus on strengthening its 
security partnership with the United States documented exemplary how the ‘pivot to Asia’ 
also reflected a clear demand of several key U.S. allies and partners for an increased 
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engagement of the United States. This alliance dynamic in the security realm however, in 
turn challenged the potential for strategic engagement with China as part of the rebalancing 
strategy.  
 
In recent years, the United States has become increasingly involved in territorial disputes of 
several of its allies and partners with China in the East and South China Sea, where 
jurisdiction and sovereignty over several territories and surrounding waters remains disputed. 
China has engaged in a series of military and paramilitary show-of-force demonstrations, 
advanced land reclamation activities, and dispatched troops to military outposts to bolster its 
territorial claims to various islands, which promise access to significant natural gas and oil 
resources, possess rich fishing grounds, and are strategically located close to important 
commercial shipping routes.36 As the U.S. Department of Defense has noted in its Asia-
Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, released in 2015, while other claimants have created 
military outposts and reclaimed land on disputed features in the South China Sea, China’s 
activities differed from previous such efforts both in scope and effect, ‘unilaterally altering 
the physical status quo in the region’.37 
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President Obama did stress U.S. support for Japan in the ongoing conflict over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands during a joint press conference with Premier Abe in April 2014: 
“(…) let me reiterate that our treaty commitment to Japan’s security is absolute, and Article 5 
covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku Islands.”38 Before 
the background of Chinese land reclamation activities and incursions into Philippine 
territorial waters, in particular around the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal, Obama 
declared that the American commitment to defend the Philippines was ‘ironclad.’ 39  In 
December 2015, Beijing filed a sharp diplomatic protest after an American B-52 bomber flew 
within two nautical miles of a Chinese-built island in the Spratlys, illustrating the potential 
for heightened tension between the two powers resulting from territorial disputes and military 
posturing in the region.40 A statement by the G-7 foreign ministers in April 2016 expressing 
‘strong opposition to any intimidating, coercive or provocative unilateral actions that could 
alter the status quo and increase tensions,’ was strongly rebuked by China.41 
 
While officially, the U.S. government is taking no side in the disputes involving China, 
Taiwan, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Japan, Secretary of Defense Ash 
Carter has made it clear that the United States military would not accept Chinese attempts to 
curtail its freedom of movement within the region, declaring that: “The United States will fly, 
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sail, and operate wherever international law allows, […] and the South China Sea is not and 
will not be an exception.”42 The United States Navy has subsequently conducted a number of 
‘freedom of navigation’ exercises, flying planes and sailing ships near disputed islands to 
underscore its right to move freely within the region. Should a confrontation between China 
and Japan or the Philippines escalate into violent conflict, the United States would be 
obligated to consider military action against China under its current treaty obligations.  
 
In addition to strengthening existing alliances and increasing its institutional involvement, the 
United States has also focused on developing ‘strategic partnerships’ with several countries 
in the region, including Myanmar (Burma), Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
India, resulting in regular diplomatic consultations and joint military exercises, and in the 
case of Singapore rotational naval deployments.43  Of particular importance has been the 
emerging strategic partnership between the United States and India. President Obama’s visit 
to India in January 2015 provided the occasion to renew a 10-year defense pact between the 
two countries, allowing the transfer of American armaments technology to India, the joint 
development and co-production of defense products in India, and collaboration on 
counterterrorism, security and regional stability.44 India already conducts more joint military 
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exercises with the United States than with any other country and defense sales increased to $9 
billion in 2014, resulting in the United States displacing Russia as India’s biggest supplier.45  
 
Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India’s traditional strategic stance of ‘non-alignment’ 
seems to haven given way toward a closer cooperation with the United States in the face of 
multiple security threats, and above all the rise of China. Given ongoing border disputes 
between the two countries and Chinese military incursions into Indian territory in the 
Himalayas in 2014, closer U.S. engagement with India however, is again likely to increase 
rather than defuse Chinese concerns about American containment and the impetus behind the 
entire rebalancing strategy. Deepening economic engagement between Washington and 
Beijing could help to offset fears of diplomatic and military encirclement, but so far the pivot 
has rather excluded than integrated China in this regard.  
 
The economic pivot  
The share of global GDP (measured in purchasing power parity terms), by the Asia-Pacific 
region has increased from under 30% in 2000 to about 40% in 2014, while North America’s 
share of global GDP has declined in the same period by 6% to 20.2%.46 If current trends 
continue, the global economic weight of the Asia-Pacific will continue to increase, even with 
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a predicted slowdown in the Chinese economy to less than double-digit growth rates. This 
dramatic shift marks the vital strategic and economic importance of the region for American 
grand strategy. Obama’s rebalancing responded to this geo-economic development by taking 
the lead in the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP) that were 
successfully concluded in October 2015. 
 
If subsequently ratified by all partner nations (Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Peru, United States, Vietnam, Chile, Brunei, Singapore, New Zealand), TPP would create the 
word’s largest regional trading bloc, edging out the European Union and NAFTA, with a 
combined population of 800 million people, accounting for almost 40% of global 
economic output. In 2014, the United States already recorded $727 billion worth of exports to 
TPP markets, which amounted to 45% of all U.S. exports.47 Besides further reducing tariffs 
and eliminating trade barriers however, TPP would also establish regulatory directives for the 
protection of intellectual property, liberalize investments, set labor and environmental 
standards, and guarantee equal treatment of state-run enterprises.48 The agreement signaled 
the Obama administration’s determination for a continued American leadership role in 
shaping the rules of the global economy, as well as for its enduring hegemonic role in Asia.  
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China, the world’s second largest economy and the largest economy in Asia has not been part 
of the TPP negotiations, fueling in turn fears in Beijing that TPP was from the beginning 
designed as an anti-China initiative. Such fears were compounded by press reports that 
referred to TPP as ‘anyone but China;’ while President Obama declared: “(…) we’ve got to 
make sure we’re writing the trade rules in the fastest-growing region of the world, the Asia-
Pacific, as opposed to having China write those rules for us.”49  
 
Underlying the original grand strategic rationale behind TPP was, despite Washington’s 
assurances to the contrary, an attempt to reverse the perception of relative but steady decline 
of the United States and its economic fortunes mirrored by the inexorable rise of China to 
economic and subsequent geopolitical supremacy in Asia. In a 2015 report for the Council on 
Foreign Relations (CFR) think tank, authors Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis linked closer 
economic integration with the TPP partner nations to a new grand strategy toward China that 
centered on ‘balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its 
ascendancy.’50  
 
The problem for the U.S. however, is that TPP, whose economic significance essentially rests 
on the combined economic weight of America and Japan, faces the growing dominance of 
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Asian-Pacific trade by China, who is already the largest respective trading partner for several 
TPP countries, including Australia, Japan, Vietnam, New Zealand, and the United States 
itself.51 Some Chinese government officials in turn see TPP membership as an opportunity 
for China to further advance its own economic and state sector reforms.52 According to the 
Chinese economist Yiping Huang, ‘an increasing number of policy advisers’ was urging the 
government to apply to join the TPP negotiations ‘as early as possible.’53 A 2014 study 
estimated that China, if it were to join TPP, could expect economic gains of $809 billion by 
2025. Staying outside the agreement would instead cost over $35 billion annually.54 
 
For China, joining TPP would mean, among other things, to further liberalize investments 
and markets currently under state-control, to end preferential treatment for state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and acceptance of the transnational investor-state dispute mechanism. 
Reforms compatible with such measures are being advocated, for example, by Zhou 
Xiaochuan, governor of the People’s Bank of China, but go beyond the limits currently set by 
the State Council and the Communist Party of China (CPC).55   
 
Meanwhile, China has engaged in a number of economic counter-initiatives intended to set 
up free-trade arrangements in Asia that would in turn exclude the United States. The China-
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led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations, for example, less 
ambitious in scope and in setting regularity standards than TPP, were launched in November 
2012 at the ASEAN Summit in Cambodia. RCEP proposes a free trade agreement between 
the member states of ASEAN and six states with which ASEAN has existing free-trade 
agreements in place (Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand). 
Negotiations are expected to be concluded in 2016, creating a regional trading bloc, which 
represents about half of the world’s population and over 30 percent of global GDP, reaching 
a combined economic output of US$ 23 trillion in 2015.56 In addition, China has been in 
negotiations about a free-trade arrangement with Japan and South Korea since 2012.  
 
China’s President Xi Jinping has also launched an ambitious effort to construct a ‘New Silk 
Road’, officially known as the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative (OBOR), designed to create a 
transcontinental economic development zone and integrated logistics and infrastructure 
network, connecting China via land and maritime routes to Central and South Asia, Africa 
and Europe.57 Beyond a focus on exports and infrastructure China seeks to use the OBOR 
initiative to enhance policy coordination across the Asian continent, further financial 
integration, and liberalize trade.58 The scope and significance of the OROB project have been 
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compared to America’s post-World War II Marshall plan, while some observers have labeled 
it ‘China’s Eurasian Pivot.’59   
 
Given geo-economic forecasts about the future centrality of the Asia-Pacific region for the 
world economy and China’s evolving economic position as key actor within that region, any 
U.S. economic strategy set to ignore or sideline China seems likely to be unsuccessful, in 
particular since most countries in the region will aim to maintain close economic ties with 
both Washington and Beijing. As Henry Kissinger has noted, most Asian countries ‘invite an 
American role in the region but seek equilibrium, not a crusade or confrontation.’60  
 
Pursuing the inclusion of China into the TPP framework would therefore allow the United 
States to re-emphasize strategic engagement with the People’s Republic as part of the 
rebalancing, and help dispel Chinese fears of containment, at least partially. Kurt Campbell, 
who as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia was one of the original architects of the 
pivot, has repeatedly stressed that the strategy was a comprehensive approach for cooperative 
engagement in the Asia-Pacific, including with China, and that it should not be reduced to its 
military dimension, either by observers in the United States, or in the region itself.61 As 
Susan Rice made clear in a speech in November 2013, the door for Beijing remained open: 
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‘We welcome any nation that is willing to live up to the high-standards of this agreement to 
join and share in the benefits of the TPP, and that includes China.’62 Furthering regional 
economic integration is in China’s national interest. In 2014, China’s Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi explained that: “China will face the member states of the TPP talks with an open attitude, 
as well as other regional or cross-region FTA initiatives.” Vice-Finance Minister Zhu 
Guangyao stated in Washington that TPP would be ‘incomplete’ in the long-term without 
China.63  
 
Should China’s integration into TPP prove to be too difficult for both sides, the United States 
could consider an alternative ‘hybrid’ approach that would link the TPP and RCEP 
agreements. A Free Trade Area for the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) could establish a middle 
ground between the high regulatory standards favored by Washington, and the lower level 
focus on trade liberalization pursued by Beijing.64 China has strongly emphasized FTAAP 
during the 2014 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, and the 2015 APEC 
summit Leaders Declaration reconfirmed that ‘FTAAP should be pursued as a comprehensive 
free trade agreement by building on ongoing regional undertakings’, singling out both TPP 
and RCEP.65  
 
  
 
  
24 
Such a regional cooperative approach would also complement negotiations currently 
underway for a comprehensive bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between the United States 
and China, which were reaffirmed as ‘top economic priority’ by President Obama and Xi 
during the latters state visit to the United States in September 2015.66  Such cooperative 
measures could readdress the balance between economic engagement and counter-balancing 
in America’s China policy, which critics have argued has tilted heavily towards military 
containment since Obama’s announcement of the pivot.67  
 
The military pivot 
Its diplomatic and economic initiatives notwithstanding, the most visible component of 
America’s rebalancing and engagement strategy, and the one that has received the greatest 
public and scholarly attention, has been the military aspect.68 One of the key results of the 
pivot was that, as announced in the 2012 DSG, from 2020 onwards, the U.S. Navy would 
have 60% of its forces stationed in the Pacific, compared to a previous rough parity of forces 
between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Of 11 active aircraft carrier strike groups, America’s 
principle tool for the global projection of military power, six would be committed to the 
region. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) would also be prioritized in terms of 
getting access to the most advanced military technologies and new equipment in the 
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American arsenal.69 Joint military exercises and maneuvers with several partners and U.S. 
allies were increased in size, scope and frequency since the announcement of the pivot.70  
 
While the 2016 U.S. defense budget of $573 billion still dwarves China’s official budget, at 
about $150 billion, the latter has become the second largest spender on defense in the world, 
acquiring sophisticated military technologies in the process. These acquisitions, from anti-
ship ballistic missiles, like the DF-21, dubbed ‘carrier killer’ in the West, to cyber warfare 
technologies could challenge U.S. primacy and coerce smaller nations in the region.71  
 
In response to this development, leading American think tanks working on national security, 
foreign policy and grand strategy, like CNAS, co-founded by Kurt Campbell, or the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), have been strongly supportive of the pivot, and 
have subsequently demanded an increase in funds and the addition of further military assets 
to credibly underwrite the strategy, aimed both at deterring China and maintaining U.S. 
hegemony.72 A widely noted 2016 CSIS report on the future of the Asia-Pacific rebalance 
demanded that the United States should ‘sustain and expand U.S. military presence in the 
Asia-Pacific’, and fund defense at higher levels, beyond sequestration imposed limits.73  
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Precisely this link between the security dimension of the rebalancing and the aim to secure 
American primacy in the Asia-Pacific however, led critics of the pivot to argue against such 
an increase of U.S. military engagement. Robert Ross, Professor of Political Science at 
Boston College, for example, proposed that the United States should instead disengage from 
maritime disputes, and scale back its military presence on China’s land borders, in order to 
reduce the growing security dilemma in the region.74 Hugh White, Professor of Strategic 
Studies at the Australian National University contended that the foundation for a new Asian 
order could neither lie in American, nor in Chinese hegemony.75  
 
Yet, securing American hegemony remains the overall goal of the rebalancing. Then 
Combatant Commander of USPACOM, U.S. Navy Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III clearly 
lined out the military rationale behind the pivot in 2013, as aimed at an Asia-Pacific region 
that was ‘secure and prosperous, underpinned by U.S. leadership and a rules-based 
international order.’76 His successor, Admiral Harry Harris directly accused China of seeking 
outright hegemony in East Asia by ‘militarizing the South China Sea’ during a Senate Armed 
Service Committee hearing in February 2016, referring to Chinese actions like the stationing 
of surface-to-air and anti-ship cruise missiles on one of its military outpost in the Paracel 
islands.77  
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China, in turn has accused the United States of its own form of militarization, citing its 
increased naval operations and new basing arrangements. Following the Joint Statement of 
the 2016 U.S.-ASEAN Special Leaders’ Summit, which problematized the situation in the 
South China Sea, Hong Lei, spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, responded that: 
“Relevant countries from outside the region should not flex their military muscles in the 
South China Sea and should not entice regional countries to carry out joint military exercises 
or patrol activities targeting a third party.”78 Both rhetorically and practically, the military 
dimension of the pivot has increased the hegemonic competition between the United States 
and China for primacy in Asia.  
 
The American military and the U.S. national security apparatus clearly see China’s growing 
military power, and in particular its anti-access and area denial capabilities (A2/AD) as 
strategic challenge to U.S. interests, and potential threat to American hegemony.79 The 2011 
National Military Strategy of the United States of America, for example, officially stated 
America’s intent to ‘oppose any nation’s actions that jeopardize access to and use of the 
global commons and cyberspace, or that threaten the security of our allies.’80 Subsequently, 
the Pentagon and national security think tanks, like the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
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Assessments (CSBA) developed the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept, which envisioned the 
‘ability to conduct operational maneuver from strategic distances—that is, the ability to 
project dominant military force across transoceanic ranges’.81 In practical terms, the U.S. 
military has drawn up several scenarios to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities: ranging from 
drones and cyber warfare; to long-range strikes against Chinese strategic and military targets; 
and a naval blockade targeting the Chinese economy.82  
 
While American officials have repeatedly stressed that the pivot is not designed to contain 
China, the military element of the rebalancing, as documented in Air-Sea Battle or the U.S. 
Navy’s ‘freedom of navigation’ exercises, is clearly focused on deterring the People’s 
Republic and maintaining America’s traditional position of military preeminence. As a senior 
U.S. Navy official has remarked: “We want to put enough uncertainty in the minds of 
Chinese military planners that they would not want to take us on. […] Air-Sea Battle is all 
about convincing the Chinese that we will win this competition.”83 Yet, specifically defining 
and resourcing Air-Sea Battle, or its currently developed successor, the Joint Concept for 
Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), as a full military containment 
strategy of China would at the same time jeopardize ongoing efforts of the Obama 
administration to seek engagement and an improved cooperative relationship with the 
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People’s Republic. As President Obama has remarked in February 2012: “I have always 
emphasized that we welcome China’s peaceful rise that we believe that a strong and 
prosperous China is one that can help to bring stability at prosperity to the region and to the 
world.”84  
 
The main challenge for American grand strategy and the future of the rebalancing is, if the 
United States can simultaneously pursue a cooperative engagement with China, while further 
strengthening and expanding its system of political, military and economic alliances and 
partnerships. The development so far suggests, that this amounts to a squaring of the circle, 
exposing a fundamental contradiction at the heart of the rebalancing. Some observers in the 
United States, such as the libertarian Cato Institute think tank, or realist International 
Relations scholars like Ross or Stephen Walt have suggested that the U.S. should resolve this 
contradiction by switching to a comprehensive strategy of offshore balancing.85  
 
This would imply a wholesale reduction of U.S. ground troops in Japan and South Korea, a 
further relocation to offshore bases and installations, such as Guam and Diego Garcia, and a 
strengthening of the independent defense capabilities of U.S. allies, while reducing the risk of 
direct U.S.-Chinese confrontation in the region. Such a radical departure from the basic 
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premise of American grand strategy however is highly unlikely, as it would negate on long-
standing U.S. alliance commitments, question America’s global leadership role, and counter-
act the thrust of the pivot, which sought more American engagement in the Asia-Pacific, not 
less.  
 
In terms of engaging China, this has left the United States with attempts to further improve 
military-to-military relations with the People’s Republic, for example, via the Military 
Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), or the establishment of new joint mechanisms, 
such as the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters initiative and the 
Notification of Major Military Activities initiative.86 These efforts, however, have had only a 
limited effect in dampening tensions, resulting from the geostrategic competition between the 
two powers.  
 
The United States should therefore explore new forms of cooperative security in the region.87 
While the fundamental dilemma resulting from competing hegemonic ambitions of the 
United States and China is unlikely to be fully resolved, a joint, institutionalized forum for 
confidence building and mutual consultation, akin to the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could help to ameliorate tensions arising from both China’s 
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rise and America’s rebalancing. The Asian Maritime Organization for Security and 
Cooperation (AMOSC) initiative by the Japanese Institute for International Policy Studies 
(IIPS), for example, seeks to improve cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific by including 
both China and the United States in such a new regional security framework. 88 
 
China and the pivot 
In China itself, America’s diplomatic, economic and military actions, despite repeated U.S. 
assurances to the contrary, have been increasingly viewed as policy of containment and threat 
to its own security interests. A 2013 Chinese White Paper on defense, for example, accused 
the United States of exacerbating tensions in the Asia-Pacific, declaring that: “There are 
some countries, which are strengthening their Asia Pacific military alliances, expanding their 
military presence in the region and frequently make the situation there tenser.”89 U.S. efforts 
to improve engagement with China in the security realm, such as inviting China for the first 
time to the annual RIMPAC naval exercise in 2014, have done little to discourage Chinese 
threat perceptions. A point that was well illustrated, when China dispatched a Dongdiao-class 
auxiliary general intelligence ship to spy on the very RIMPAC proceedings it participated 
in.90 
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Ultimately, the American vision of an Asia-Pacific continuing under Pax Americana, albeit 
with greater ‘burden-sharing’ is one that China does not share. From a Chinese perspective, 
the increase of U.S. military assets and development of operational concepts against A2/AD 
capabilities, - whether called Air-Sea Battle or JAM-GC-, the strengthening of America’s 
strategic partnerships and alliances with countries, which oppose China’s territorial claims, 
and the development of TPP under exclusion of China all seemed designed to counter the rise 
of the country into its ‘natural’ and historic position as the region’s hegemon. As a result of 
these competing strategic visions of hegemony in Asia, China has developed alternative 
security and economic arrangements that in turn exclude the United States, rather than 
becoming a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the eyes of Washington.  
 
When Robert Zoellick, then Deputy Secretary of State, coined the term in a speech in 2005, 
he urged China to ‘sustain the international system’ that had ‘enabled its success.’ 91 
According to Zoellick this would mean further political and economic liberalization at home 
and greater diplomatic engagement aboard, from combating international terrorism to halting 
the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In other words, the United States sought 
to further integrate China into a liberal, international system of rules and norms it itself had 
created, and which it continued to be at the center of. Urging China to become a ‘responsible 
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stakeholder’ subsequently became a commonplace of American and Western rhetoric, 
expressing the firmly held belief that the People’s Republic would ultimately not seek, nor 
want to seek a change of status quo, either globally or in the Asia-Pacific, and instead 
become more Western in its behavior and character. In recent years however, China has 
clearly indicated that it would seek to establish political, economic and institutional 
arrangements that could side-line the United States and circumvent a Western-led system, 
instead advancing its own version of an ‘Asia-Pacific Dream.’ This regional strategic concept 
was envisioned to work alongside the ‘Chinese Dream’ advocated by Xi Jinping, aimed at the 
further modernization and revitalization of the Chinese state, economy and society.92 
 
As the Chinese President declared in a speech in May 2014 in Shanghai, the ‘Asia-Pacific 
Dream’ should involve a new security concept for the region: “In the final analysis, it is for 
the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the 
security of Asia.“ 93 To this effect, Xi proposed to enhance the capacity and institutional 
building of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia 
(CICA), and to explore the establishment of a regional architecture for cooperative security. 
China would also underwrite the economic dimension of the ‘Asia-Pacific dream’ with 
establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and by committing US$40 
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billion to a new Silk Road Fund, intended to provide investment and financing support in 
infrastructure, resources development and industrial cooperation. 94  In addition, China’s 
involvement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the BRICS countries further 
underlined its ambition to take a leading role and move outside the U.S.-led system.   
 
Chinese behavior in the South and East China Sea has also become rather more than less 
assertive since the announcement of the pivot. 95 In March 2014, boats of the Chinese coast 
guard blocked access to a Philippine outpost on the Spratly Islands. In May of the same year, 
China installed an oilrig inside Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and clashed with 
Vietnamese fishing boats there. Similar incidents have been occurring regularly between 
Chinese and Japanese fishing and coast guard vessels around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
since 2010. One of the most significant moves indicating China’s growing territorial 
ambitions was the Chinese declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the 
islands in November 2013. Washington reacted by sending two B-52 bombers through the 
zone, clearly stating that it did not recognize the Chinese claim, yet advised civilian airlines 
to observe it nonetheless. China has also begun construction of a military base on the island 
of Nanji, located about 300 kilometers from the Senkakus/Diaoyus.  
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The conflict between America’s vision of a ‘Pacific Century’ the pivot was to initiate and the 
‘Asia-Pacific Dream’ put forward by China under Xi appears as contest between two 
different and seemingly incompatible versions of hegemony. On the one side, stands the 
traditional role of the United States, who sees itself as self-interested but benign guarantor of 
an open system of liberal democracy and free trade, underwritten by American political 
values, its economic clout and military power. On the other, stands the Chinese claim to 
preponderance in the Asia-Pacific, based on the country’s rising economic and military 
profile and its historic preeminence, with Chinese civilization as the ancient political, 
economic and cultural center of gravity for the region.  
 
This geopolitical competition over economic and military leadership in the region has 
increasingly been affecting U.S.-China relations. While China, for example, enlisted twenty-
one countries to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank it promised to provide with 
half of the initial US$ 50 billion start-up capital, Washington engaged in diplomatic lobbying 
against the Chinese initiative.96 As a BBC comment put it, by signing up to the AIIB, key 
U.S. allies like the UK, Germany and Australia were ‘effectively endorsing Beijing's effort to 
establish financial rivals to the Bretton Woods institutions, […] which are dominated by 
America.’97  
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At the same time, President Xi Jinping has proposed to build a ‘new type of major-country 
relationship’ with the United States, which ultimately called on the two countries to 
recognize each other as equal great powers, and would essentially demand that the U.S. 
accept China as Asia’s leading power and de facto hegemon. At the informal US-China 
summit in California in June 2013, Xi put forward the concept, mentioning three foundational 
principles: no conflict and no confrontation; mutual respect, including for both countries’ 
‘core interests’ and major concerns; and a win-win cooperation.98 The concept of China’s 
‘core interests’ remains one of the greatest obstacles standing in the way of a rapprochement 
of the two countries, since China regards its ‘national sovereignty and territorial integrity’ as 
the one of its key strategic objectives.99 Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity does not 
only include reunification with Taiwan on PRC terms, but also China’s disputed territorial 
claims and assertion within the ‘first island chain.’  
 
In a Chinese language press briefing of the Xi-Obama meeting, a spokesperson for the 
Chinese foreign ministry stated that the Diaoyu Islands involved China’s ‘sovereignty and 
territorial integrity’ and therefore China’s ‘core interest’.100 Although this statement was later 
deleted from the English-language transcript, the episode seemed to confirm American and 
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Western strategic assessments of Chinese behavior as aimed at achieving dominance within 
the ‘first island chain.’ Chinese documents refer to this area, which encompasses the majority 
of the South China Sea, as the ‘9-dash-line’, based on historic maps submitted by China to 
the United Nations in support of its territorial claims.101 According to American estimates of 
rising Chinese military capabilities, including the presence of by then multiple Chinese 
aircraft carrier strike groups, the South China Sea would ‘virtually be a Chinese lake’ by 
2025.102 To date however, China has not officially clarified the meaning of the ‘9-dash-line,’ 
or articulated its legal basis, further complicating U.S.-China relations.  
 
While the United States and China continue to disagree over territorial issues, the Obama 
administration has also taken steps to not let the situation escalate into open confrontation. 
According to a Navy Times article from April 2016 National Security Adviser Rice ordered 
U.S. military leaders like Admiral Harris to tone down their rhetoric vis-à-vis China over the 
South China Sea dispute.103 President Xi’s first state visit to Washington in September 2015 
similarly indicated a renewed emphasis on engagement. Both countries confirmed their 
partnership on issues like Afghanistan, climate change, or UN peacekeeping, and 
strengthened cooperation on cyber security, agreeing not to ‘conduct or knowingly support 
cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property’.104  Both sides also created a high-level joint 
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dialogue mechanism on cybercrime and related issues. 105 This was a sign of progress, since 
the United States had repeatedly accused China of sponsoring cyber espionage, including 
with the high-profile data theft at the Office of Personnel Management in June 2015.  
 
Yet, the state visit also revealed the enduring competing strategic and geopolitical aspirations 
of the two powers. While the Chinese Foreign Ministry, for example, listed agreement to 
‘continue the endeavor to build a new model of major-country relationship between China 
and the United States’ as top outcome of the state visit, the White House equivalent lacked 
any reference to this point.106 Some prominent American strategists and long-time observers 
of U.S.-China relations however, like Kissinger or Zbigniew Brzezinski have advocated 
similar approaches to the ‘new type’ model, which would stress cooperative partnership on a 
basis of equality, mutual respect and joint interests, rather than the attempted integration of 
China into a U.S.-led order.107 Here, the United States could, for example, consider giving up 
its resistance against the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, where it expressed concerns 
over ‘governance, environmental and social safeguards’, and join the Chinese-led 
organization. 108  As with combining TPP and RCEP, or a new cooperative security 
architecture however, such an emphasis of engagement with China would imply that the 
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United States could accept a hegemonic co-habitation for the Asia-Pacific, rather than the 
mere perpetuation of American primacy in the region.  
 
Rebalancing with restraint: Sequestration, domestic politics and America’s enduring 
global commitments 
 
This fundamental conceptual problem of the pivot that faces both a prospective partner and 
potential rival in China is compounded by the limited means and political ambiguity with 
which the rebalancing is underwritten both economically and militarily. Sequestration and 
Washington’s cautious response to the advance of ISIS and the Russian annexation of Crimea 
seem to have questioned the ultimate credibility of American security commitments with key 
allies in the region.109 Meanwhile, the on-going political gridlock and partisan polarization 
that resulted in sequestration, is raising fundamental questions about the problem-solving 
capacity of the political class in Washington. Ernest Bower, a senior analyst at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, has commented how the protracted struggle to obtain 
presidential fast-track authority in Congress negatively impacted America’s image in Asia: 
“American partners, particularly in Southeast Asia, are really worried about a narrative they 
see in Beijing -- that is, the Chinese see weakness in Washington right now.”110  
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Since its inception the United States’ rebalancing has been measured against America’s fiscal 
difficulties and ongoing cuts to the defense budget. As a result of sequestration, the strength 
of the active-duty U.S. Army was reduced from 570,000 to 475,000 troops, supposed to reach 
an end-strength of 450,000 in 2018. The U.S. Marine Corps would shift from 202,000 troops 
in 2012 to 182,000 troops in 2017. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force received fewer new 
ships and aircraft than originally demanded, while training exercises were curtailed or 
cancelled. Should sequestration levels stay in place after 2017, the numbers of the U.S. Army 
and U.S. Marine Corps are scheduled to drop even further, to levels of 420.000 and 175.000 
respectively, together with the retirement of an air craft carrier, and further cuts to the 
numbers of U.S. ships and airplanes.111 During his Senate confirmation process as PACOM 
commander Admiral Harris explained that: “Continued reductions to meet sequestration-
mandated resource levels will diminish our military's size, reach, and margin of technological 
superiority.”112  
 
The Obama administration has always opposed sequestration and continued to adhere to the 
central tenets of American exceptionalism, global leadership and military preeminence as 
documented in the 2015 National Security Strategy and other key strategy documents. At the 
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same time, the practice of U.S. defense policy needed to be reconciled with concern for the 
sustainability of the United States’ fiscal situation. The result was a contradiction between 
grand strategy rhetoric and practice that negatively affected the Asian pivot. According to 
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, if not repealed by Congress, sequestration would 
ultimately force ‘significant changes to the U.S. military’s global posture and strategy.’113 In 
March 2014, Katrina McFarland, assistant secretary of defense for acquisition in the 
Pentagon was quoted as saying: “Right now, the pivot is being looked at again, because 
candidly it can’t happen”.114  
 
While a two-year budget deal was reached in 2015, increasing the DOD base budget for 
fiscal year 2016 from sequestration levels of $498 billion to $522 billion, sequestration is 
scheduled to remain in place for 2018 and beyond.115 The Congressionally mandated and 
Pentagon-commissioned Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025 study by CSIS concluded that cuts to 
the defense budget from 2009-2015 had already limited the Pentagon’s ability to pursue the 
rebalance, and that long-term budget uncertainty was creating a difficult environment for the 
future of the strategy.116  
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In addition, the report found that despite issuing a series of speeches and statement there was 
no clear, coherent and consistent strategy for the rebalancing in place, leading to confusion 
within the U.S. government and among America’s allies over its intention and 
implementation.117 While the United States military is expected to maintain a qualitative edge 
over its Chinese counterpart, the enacted cuts to the Pentagon budget and negative public 
reactions by political and military officials on its effects challenged the key narrative of the 
rebalancing as securing America’s long-term position in the ‘Pacific Century’.  
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How American politics and the fiscal situation of the United States could negatively impact 
the credibility of the pivot was illustrated in October 2013, when President Obama had to 
cancel a high-profile trip to Asia, including his participation in the APEC summit and the 
East Asia Summit, due to the temporary government shutdown in Washington. 118  The 
negative influence of domestic politics on the rebalancing could also extend to ratification of 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, given a rise of protectionist sentiment in the U.S. in the 2016 
presidential campaign. This has already resulted in Hillary Clinton, one of the original 
architects of the pivot, and the Democratic Party’s likely presidential candidate, to withdraw 
her support for TPP.119  
 
The recent crises in Syria, Iraq and Ukraine, and a renewed focus of the Obama 
administration on the Middle East and Europe, have further added to this credibility problem 
of the pivot. Under President Obama, the United States has reduced its geopolitical level of 
ambition and is more reluctant to act as the world’s policeman. Events like the rise of ISIS 
and the annexation of Crimea however, have questioned the ability of America to pull out 
from its global security responsibilities, and to strategically prioritize one particular region at 
the expense of other areas.120. Since transition to a more cost-effective grand strategy of 
offshore balancing either globally, or in the Asia-Pacific seems highly unlikely, this makes it 
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imperative for the United States to seek continued engagement with China in order to reduce 
the potential for future conflict. At the same time, Washington will need to reassure U.S. 
allies that its global commitments and domestic challenges do not endanger the rebalancing. 
This would likely have to involve a further increase of financial and military resources, 
beyond levels proposed by sequestration.    
 
 
Conclusion 
The ‘pivot to Asia’ is testament to a strategic dilemma between primacy, cooperative 
engagement and restraint prevalent in US foreign and security policy under the Obama 
administration. This contradiction has significant implications for U.S.-China relations, the 
development of U.S. relations with its Asian allies, and the domestic planning of grand 
strategy. The attempt to maintain and strengthen America’s leadership position in the Asia-
Pacific through a combination of cooperative engagement and strategic restraint is ultimately 
unlikely to succeed, due to the inconsistencies of that strategy. On the one side, the increased 
diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation with U.S. allies and partners in the region is 
fueling fears in Beijing that Washington is trying to contain China and halt its rise. This in 
turn provokes Chinese counter-measures, risking a growing security dilemma in the region, 
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resulting from a clash of two competing visions of hegemony and regional preeminence. This 
struggle for supremacy is already visible in areas such as the ongoing competing free-trade 
negotiations in Asia, or the various territorial disputes involving China and its neighbors. Yet, 
the United States is also unable to fully integrate China into a system of economic and 
security arrangements, essentially designed to prolong America’s liberal hegemony, while 
China seeks to establish its own hegemonic position in the region. 
 
On the other hand, the emphasis on ‘strategic patience’ and restraint, America’s enduring 
global security commitments, uncertainty about strategic coherence and consistency, and the 
limitation of fiscal and military resources due to Congressional sequestration are undermining 
the political credibility of the rebalancing, both at home and abroad. Even if a containment of 
China was America’s strategic intention, the means provided would be unable to achieve this 
goal. The pivot thus presents an uneasy and ultimately unconvincing strategic compromise 
between heightened U.S. engagement with the region as a whole, and a soft containment of 
China within the Asia-Pacific.  
 
While this fundamental strategic dilemma is unlikely to be resolved, the United States should 
seed to improve cooperative engagement with China in order to ameliorate Beijing’s fear of 
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containment, and to reduce the risk of conflict resulting from competing hegemonic designs. 
Attempts to include China in the TPP agreement, or linking TPP and RCEP could provide 
such an opportunity, as would developing a new cooperative framework for maritime 
security. This however, would require for the United States to move somewhat closer to the 
model of a ‘new type’ of great power relationship proposed by China, while rejecting 
Chinese claims to outright hegemony. At the same time, the United States would have to 
invest additional resources, in particular in the military realm, in order to sustain the 
credibility of the rebalancing, and to reassure its allies and partners in the region. 
Successfully managing this strategic, geopolitical, and economic balancing act will be a key 
task for President Obama’s successor in the White House.  
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